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 NEWS  RELEASE   
    Contact:  Andy Nielsen 
FOR RELEASE  June 30, 2006  515/281-5834 
Auditor of State David A. Vaudt today released a report on a review of selected general and 
application controls over the Iowa Department of Transportation’s Accounts Payable System for 
the period July 11, 2005 through August 3, 2005. 
Vaudt recommended the Department implement procedures to strengthen employee 
password reset policies, improve controls over the migration of programs into production, develop 
written policies for access to and modification of system software, update and test the contingency 
plan, conduct periodic vulnerability assessments, review the listing of individuals with elevated 
privileges and strengthen procedures for handling output. 
A copy of the report is available for review at the Iowa Department of Transportation, 
in the Office of Auditor of State and on the Auditor of State’s web site at 
http://auditor.iowa.gov/reports/reports.htm. 
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February 28, 2006 
 
To Nancy J. Richardson, Director of the  
Iowa Department of Transportation: 
In conjunction with our audit of the financial statements of the State of Iowa for the year 
ended June 30, 2005, we conducted an information technology review of selected general and 
application controls of the Iowa Department of Transportation for the period July 11, 2005 
through August 3, 2005.  Our review focused on the general and application controls of the Iowa 
Department of Transportation’s Accounts Payable System as they relate to our audit of the 
financial statements.  The review was more limited than would be necessary to give an opinion on 
internal controls.  Accordingly, we do not express an opinion on internal controls or ensure all 
deficiencies in internal controls are disclosed. 
In conducting our review, we became aware of certain aspects concerning information 
technology controls for which we believe corrective action is necessary.  As a result, we have 
developed recommendations which are reported on the following pages.  We believe you should be 
aware of these recommendations which pertain to the Department’s general and application 
controls over the Accounts Payable System.  These recommendations have been discussed with 
Department personnel and their responses to these recommendations are included in this report. 
This report, a public record by law, is intended solely for the information and use of the 
officials and employees of the Iowa Department of Transportation, citizens of the State of Iowa and 
other parties to whom the Iowa Department of Transportation may report.  This report is not 
intended to be and should not be used by anyone other than these specified parties. 
We would like to acknowledge the many courtesies and assistance extended to us by 
personnel of the Iowa Department of Transportation during the course of our review.  Should you 
have questions concerning any of the above matters, we shall be pleased to discuss them with you 
at your convenience.  Individuals who participated in our review of the Accounts Payable System 
are listed on page 10 and they are available to discuss these matters with you. 
 
 
 
  DAVID A. VAUDT, CPA  WARREN G. JENKINS, CPA 
  Auditor of State  Chief Deputy Auditor of State 
 
cc:  Honorable Thomas J. Vilsack, Governor 
  Michael L. Tramontina, Director, Department of Management 
  Dennis C. Prouty, Director, Legislative Services Agency Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Transportation  
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Accounts Payable System General and Application Controls 
A.  Background 
The Iowa Department of Transportation’s Accounts Payable System is used to 
process payments to vendors for goods and services delivered. 
B.  Scope and Methodology 
In conjunction with our audit of the financial statements of the State of Iowa, we 
reviewed selected aspects of the general and application controls in place over the 
Iowa Department of Transportation’s Accounts Payable System for the period 
July  11, 2005 through August 3, 2005.  Specifically, we reviewed the general 
controls: security program, access controls, application software development and 
change controls, system software controls, segregation of duties and service 
continuity; and the application controls: input, processing and output controls.  
We interviewed staff of the Department and we reviewed Department policies and 
procedures.  To assess the level of compliance with identified controls, we 
performed selected tests. 
We planned and performed our review to adequately assess those Department 
operations within the scope of our review.  We developed an understanding of the 
Department’s internal controls relevant to the operations included in the scope of 
our review.  We believe our review provides a reasonable basis for our 
recommendations. 
We used a risk-based approach when selecting activities to be reviewed.  We focused 
our review efforts on those activities we identified through a preliminary survey as 
having the greatest probability for needing improvement.  Consequently, by 
design, we used our finite review resources to identify where and how 
improvements can be made.  Thus, we devoted little effort to reviewing operations 
that may be relatively efficient or effective.  As a result, we prepare our review 
reports on an “exception basis.”  This report, therefore, highlights those areas 
needing improvement and does not address activities that may be functioning 
properly. 
C.  Results of the Review 
As a result of our review, we found certain controls can be strengthened to further 
ensure the reliability of financial information.  Our recommendations, along with 
the Department’s responses, are detailed in the remainder of this report. 
 
General Controls 
(1)  System Software Modifications – Formal policies and procedures should exist for 
requesting and authorizing new or modified system software.  At a minimum, 
policies should include the use of a change request system, acceptance testing, 
documentation of management review and approval, a chronological record of 
changes and a problem log for tracking and troubleshooting system software. 
Formal written policies and procedures for system software changes have not been 
developed. Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Transportation  
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Recommendation – The Department’s IT Division should develop written policies 
and procedures to control system software modifications. 
Response – The IT Division will expand existing procedures into an Applications 
Technology Services team work directive.  The IT Division is working to implement 
the HP OpenView Service Desk product around July 2006.  A Change Control 
module within this application will be customized to meet our needs in tracking 
system software modification. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
(2)  Vulnerability Assessments – Internet–borne attacks targeting security vulnerabilities 
occur on a daily basis and can threaten assets and mission critical systems.  A 
proven way to reduce risks from attack is to proactively test systems and 
implement appropriate counter measures.  Vulnerability assessments are a 
valuable tool in this process and help in gauging the effectiveness of security 
measures. 
Vulnerability assessments have not been performed. 
Recommendation – The Department’s IT Division should establish procedures to 
ensure vulnerability assessments are conducted periodically for critical systems. 
Response – The Department will either engage the State of Iowa Information 
Security Office (ISO) to use their vulnerability assessment tool named Core 
Impactor or the Department will work with the ISO to contract with a vendor to 
perform the assessment. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
(3)  System Software Access – Controls over access to and modification of system 
software and system software utilities are essential in providing reasonable 
assurance operating system-based security controls are not compromised.  Access 
to system software and sensitive software utilities should be restricted to a very 
limited number of personnel whose job responsibilities require they have access.  
Application programmers and computer operators should not have access to 
system software, as this would be incompatible with their assigned 
responsibilities. 
Policies and procedures do not provide guidance on restricting access to system 
software and utilities and access logs are not periodically reviewed.  Additionally, a 
complete listing of available system utilities has not been maintained. 
Recommendation – The Department’s IT Division should develop policies and 
procedures to strictly limit access to system software and sensitive utilities.   
Additionally, a complete listing of available utilities should be maintained and 
access logs should be periodically reviewed. 
Response –   The Department will develop work directives which limit access to 
system software and utilities.  The work directives will reflect existing procedures 
which utilize a dual control method for protection of data.  The primary method 
restricts access to data through IBM’s Resource Access Control Facility (RACF) 
security.  The secondary method restricts access to sensitive utilities through 
RACF. Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Transportation  
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A list of utilities has been compiled.  Those utilities controlled through RACF will be 
indicated on the list.  A work directive will be established requiring periodic review 
of utilities controlled through RACF, who has accessed them, and utility usage 
rates.  An IT Division work directive will be written requiring all requests, with 
accompanying justification, for access to RACF-controlled utilities to be approved 
by the Application Technology Services manager prior to access being granted. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
(4)  Employee Password Reset – Occasionally, users forget passwords needed to gain 
access to system resources and are required to call the help desk to have their 
password reset.  User verification procedures help ensure the authenticity of the 
user asking for a password reset. 
Current steps taken to authenticate users could be strengthened. 
Recommendation – The Department’s IT Division should strengthen procedures for 
the verification of the authenticity of the user prior to resetting their password. 
Response – The Department purchased the Proginet software to aid password 
resets.  This software allows the user to store answer questions of their choice.  
Users who forget their password can go to a web site and answer questions with 
their unique pre-recorded responses.  If the questions are answered correctly they 
will be allowed to reset their own password.  Users who have not answered the 
questions or who have forgotten the answers to the questions are asked to call the 
Call Center who then will contact the user's supervisor.  The supervisor verifies the 
identity of the user needing a reset.  The Call Center then resets the questions to 
“null” which requires the user to establish new answers.  The user then can reset 
their own passwords. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
(5)  Access to Programs Turned in for Review – After a programmer completes a change 
to a program and management approves the change, operations is notified by a 
“blue card” when the program is ready to be loaded to the production library.   
Until the program is migrated to the production library by operations, the 
programmer still has access to the program and could make unauthorized 
changes. 
Recommendation – The Department’s IT Division should implement controls to 
ensure programmers do not have access to a program after management approval 
and before migration to the production library by operations. 
Response – The IT Division has implemented a new source code repository for all 
mainframe and client/server source code thus eliminating this concern.   
Versioning of the source code ensures management approved code is the only code 
which is placed into production. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
 Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Transportation  
 
July 11, 2005 through August 3, 2005 
 
 
7 
(6)  Temporary Program Copies – A programmer has the authority to take a copy of a 
production program or to take a second “temporary” copy in order to make 
changes.  A log is maintained to document the first copy taken.  However, the log 
does not document who took a second “temporary” copy.  Additionally, if the 
“temporary” copy is placed with operations to be put into production first, an 
unauthorized program may be implemented without management oversight. 
Recommendation – The Department’s IT Division should establish procedures to 
ensure logs document the distribution of all copies taken of a program. 
Response – The IT Division has implemented a new source code repository for all 
mainframe and client/server source code thus eliminating this concern.  The 
software records the userid of the programmer along with a date/time stamp each 
time the program is checked in, and also records incremental changes with each 
new version.  This recording of incremental changes eliminates the possibility that 
a program change could be placed into production without management approval. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
(7)  Contingency Plan – Losing the capability to process, retrieve and protect information 
maintained electronically can significantly affect the Department’s ability to 
accomplish its mission.  For this reason, the Department should have procedures 
in place to protect information resources and minimize the risk of unplanned 
interruptions and a plan to recover critical operations should interruptions occur.  
The Department participated in a State initiative to develop continuity of 
operations and continuity of government plans, but a contingency plan for 
recovery of the data processing center in the event of a disaster has not been 
formally adopted. 
Recommendation – The Department’s IT Division should update and formally adopt 
a contingency plan for the recovery of operations in the event of a disaster.  Copies 
of the plan should be provided to responsible individuals and stored at an off-site 
location.  The plan should also be tested periodically. 
Response – The DOT has prepared an overall Continuity of Operations/Continuity of 
Government (COOP/COG) plan which was submitted to Homeland Security and 
incorporated as Annex Y in the statewide COOP/COG plan.  Elaboration of this 
plan will take place in FY2007. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
(8)  RACF Access – IBM’s Resource Access Control Facility (RCAF) is used by the 
Department to control system access.  Three attributes (special, audit and 
operations) provide users with extraordinary privileges.  We noted 30 individuals 
with the special attribute which allows the modification of all profiles in the RACF 
database and lets the user perform all functions except those requiring the audit 
attribute.  Also, three users’ password intervals were set to “NoInterval”, meaning 
the system would not force the user to change their password periodically. 
Recommendation – The Department’s IT Division should periodically review the 
special, audit and operations attributes to ensure they are granted only to those 
individuals requiring these levels of access to perform their job duties and 
passwords are required to be periodically changed. Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Transportation  
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Response – The RACF access listing has been reviewed for individuals with the “s” 
(special) attribute and a determination made as to whether this access is required.  
An IT Division work directive will be written to require quarterly review of 
individuals possessing special, audit and operations attributes.  Requests for the 
elevated attributes, along with the required justification, will be sent to the 
Application Technology Services team manager for approval. 
 
The work directive will also require quarterly review to discover whether any 
“NoInterval” passwords exist.  The work directive will state all passwords must be 
reset at specific intervals. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
 
Application Controls 
(1)  Written Policies and Procedures – Written procedures help ensure the consistency, 
accuracy and completeness of output produced as personnel change. The 
Department has not developed written procedures covering the reconciliation, 
verification and handling of system output. 
Recommendation – The Department should develop written procedures for system 
output, including the reconciliation, verification and handling of output. 
Response – We will comply with the auditor’s recommendation. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
(2)  Segregation of Duties – Work responsibilities are typically segregated so one 
individual does not control all critical stages of a process or perform incompatible 
duties.  This helps diminish the likelihood errors or wrongful acts will go 
undetected because the activities of one group or individual will serve as a check 
on the activities of the other. 
Four individuals have the ability to change a vendor address and approve the 
transaction at the accounting level. 
Recommendation – The Department should modify responsibilities so individuals 
applying accounting level approval cannot change vendor addresses. 
Response – The Department does not have the resources to completely segregate 
these functions and provide cross training amongst staff for critical functions.   
Due to the compensating controls implemented within the Accounts Payable 
System, the Department believes it has minimized the risk associated with this 
situation.   
Compensating controls include: 1) While the address could be changed by these 
three individuals, the vendor name can not be changed on a voucher which has 
already been initiated.  Therefore, the warrant would still be made out to the 
approved vendor and need to be endorsed by the approved vendor or designee to 
be considered a valid endorsement, 2) Two levels of approval are needed before a 
voucher can be paid and these approvals can not be applied by the same person,  Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Transportation  
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3) The creation of  voucher, Office approval and Accounting approval can not be 
applied by the same individual, 4) Vendor entry and update is restricted to 
designated individuals and 5) The address and vendor name is stamped in the 
voucher log when paid (newly added in FY2005), identifying where the payment 
was mailed and who the warrant was made out to. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
(3)  Warrant Custody – Warrants to pay vouchers not paid by EFT are written in Des 
Moines by the Department of Administrative Services and delivered to Ames by 
shuttle.  Warrants for contractor pay vouchers and multiple page accounts 
payable vouchers are separated from the warrants for simple, one or two page 
vouchers.  Contractor pay vouchers and multiple page accounts payable vouchers 
are stuffed with the warrants and mailed from Ames.  Simple one or two page 
vouchers are sent to Des Moines with the warrants for stuffing and mailing. 
No record is kept of which warrants are mailed from Ames and which warrants are 
sent to Des Moines for mailing.  Also, warrants prepared for delivery to Des 
Moines were not always stored in a secure location. 
Recommendation – The Department should develop procedures to ensure the 
accountability and security of warrants is maintained. 
Response – The warrant listing provides a record of the warrants that are mailed 
from Ames and those sent to Des Moines for mailing.  We reconcile the dollar 
amount of the abstract to the warrant listing.  We do not create a listing for those 
vouchers that are “pulled” for special mailing.  Such a hand-prepared listing 
would only add time to the process and provide little real benefit should a warrant 
turn up missing, since the abstract/warrant listing gives us all the information 
necessary.  Our procedures for lost checks are the same whether they were special 
mailing or not.    
The warrants are received the previous day and are kept in a locked filing cabinet 
overnight for processing early the following morning.  There have been a few 
instances when the courier returned late and has kept the warrants in mail room 
until the next morning.  We will work with mail services to ensure that the 
warrants are secure under such conditions. 
Conclusion – Response acknowledged.  If the batch of warrants sent to Des Moines 
for mailing are lost or destroyed in transit, the identification and replacement of 
those warrants could be difficult. Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Transportation  
 
July 11, 2005 through August 3, 2005 
 
 
10 
 
Staff: 
Questions or requests for further assistance should be directed to: 
  Erwin L. Erickson, CPA, Director 
  Ernest H. Ruben, Jr., CPA, Senior Auditor II 
  Andrew E. Nielsen, CPA, Deputy Auditor of State 
Other individuals who participated on this review include: 
  Patricia J. King, CPA, Senior Auditor II 
  Shawn R. Elsbury, Assistant Auditor 
  Carey L. Fraise, Assistant Auditor 
  Scott D. Trauger, Assistant Auditor 
  Donna R. Neubauer, Assistant Auditor 
 